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I Comments I
Title VII: How Recent Developments
in the Law of Sexual Harassment
Apply With Equal Force to Claims of
Racial Harassment
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."' In the case of Rogers v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,2 the Fifth Circuit
stated that an employee's psychological as well as economic
fringes3 are entitled to statutory protection from employer abuse,
and that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment" is "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 4
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
2. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972).
3. See also discussion infra Part III.A.2.
4. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238; see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
64 (1986) (stating that this phrase "evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' "(quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13)).
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There are two forms of harassment that violate Title VII-quid
pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. Quid pro
quo harassment occurs when an employer takes a tangible adverse
employment action against an employee, whereas hostile environ-
ment harassment does not affect the employee's economic benefits
but creates a hostile or abusive work environment.' Although quid
pro quo harassment will be briefly discussed, this Comment will
focus on claims based on a hostile work environment.
Rogers was the first case to recognize a cause of action for
racial harassment based upon a discriminatory work environment.6
Rogers held that "employment discrimination was not limited to the
'isolated and distinguishable events' of 'hiring, firing, and promot-
ing.' ,7 To the contrary, a work environment that is so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and
psychological stability of its employees can also violate Title VII. 8
Employees have the right to work in an environment that is free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.9 When
enacting Title VII, Congress expected that the statute would result
in the " 'removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.' "0
Such an objective can be achieved only if employees can work
without being harassed.1'
In addition to establishing a cause of action for a hostile or
abusive work environment, Title VII extends to claims of racial and
sexual discrimination based on a hostile work environment. 2
5. See Jana Howard Carey, Defending Sexual Harassment Claims, 587 PLI/LIT 7, 9
(1998).
6. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
7. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238); see also Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 64 (stating that Title VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination).
8. See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
9. See White v. The Money Store, No. 97-3056, 1998 WL 124062, at *5 (7th Cir. March
17, 1998).
10. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3rd Cir. 1990) (quoting Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co., 80 F.3d
1107, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 169 (1996) ("[tjhe elements and burden of
proof that a Title VII plaintiff must meet are the same for racially charged harassment as for
sexually charged harassment"); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 n.7 (3d Cir.
1995) ("[t]he [Supreme] Court has recognized no difference in standards applicable to
racially and sexually hostile work environments"); see also Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call
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Claims of racial and sexual harassment are governed by the same
legal standards. 3 Recently, the Supreme Court decided two
important cases under Title VII, altering the principles of employer
liability for discriminatory harassment. 14 Because these decisions
involved claims of sexual harassment, the question arises whether
the newly established principles set forth in these cases apply with
equal force to racial harassment cases.
Part II of this Comment specifically discusses the elements
necessary to establish a hostile work environment claim. It
examines some of the tests adopted by various courts in evaluating
such claims, including an individual's membership in a protected
class, the requirement of severe and pervasive conduct, the
interference with an employee's work performance, and the basis
for employer liability as it existed prior to the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions. Part III focuses on Faragher and Ellerth and discusses
the new standards established for employment liability. It also
explores the question of whether these principles apply with equal
force to claims of racial harassment.
Finally, Part IV discusses some preventive measures employers
might use to protect themselves from liability under the principles
set forth in Faragher and Ellerth.
II. Background
A. Elements of a Hostile-Work Environment
Prior to the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, courts agreed that
the principles governing workplace harassment claims are the same
regardless of whether a claim is based on race or sex.15 Addition-
ally, although their tests may differ, courts do agree that a plaintiff
must prove that he or she, a member of a protected class, was
Me A "Bitch" Just Don't Use The "N-Word": Some Thoughts On Galloway v. General
Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Insurance Co., 46
DEPAUL L. REV. 741 (1997) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66). " 'The EEOC has long
recognized that harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin is an
unlawful employment practice in violation of Title VII.... [Tihe principles involved with
regard to sexual harassment [also] apply to harassment on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin.' " Id. at 777 n.3 (quoting 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) §§ 615.7(a)-(b)
(Jan. 1982)).
13. See Gregory, supra note 12, at 741.
14. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); see also Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
15. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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subjected to harassment, which both subjectively and objectively
affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, for
which the employer is liable.16
In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 7 the Supreme
Court set clear guidelines for determining whether a hostile work
environment exists. The Court stated that whether an environment
is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at the
totality of the circumstances. 8 Additionally, the Court held that
the conduct need not seriously affect an employee's psychological
well-being to be actionable and that the standard for determining
the severity or pervasiveness of particular conduct has both an
objective and subjective component. t9
Although courts review harassment claims under both a
subjective and objective standard as established by the Supreme
Court in Harris, some courts have chosen to apply a multi-factor
test. For example, in West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,20 the Third
Circuit used the five-factor test developed in 1986 in Andrews v.
City of Philadelphia.2' Under this test, in order for a plaintiff to
bring a successful claim for a hostile work environment, he or she
must prove that: (1) the plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination
because of his or her membership in a protected class; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; 22 (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in the same protected
class; and (5) respondeat superior liability exists. 23 The Andrews
court adopted the objective and subjective approach established in
16. See infra text accompanying notes 17-27.
17. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
18. See id. at 23.
19. See id. at 21-22 ("A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does
not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them
from advancing in their careers").
20. 45 F.3d 744 (3d Cir. 1995).
21. 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990).
22. The court in Andrews stated that the discriminatory conduct must be pervasive and
regular and cited to Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir. 1987) for the
proposition that "[h]arassment is pervasive when 'incidents of harassment occur either in
concert or with regularity.' " Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484. The Supreme Court in Meritor,
however, stated that the discrimination must be "pervasive and severe." Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). But see Bouton v. BMW of N.Am., Inc., 29
F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994) (declining to resolve whether the distinction in language was
inadvertent).
23. See West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d at 753 (3d Cir. 1995).
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Harris in developing the third and fourth prongs of its test-that
the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff and the
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in
the same protected class.24
Other courts, however, have declined to adopt a multi-factor
test. For example, in White v. The Money Store,25 the Tenth
Circuit declined to apply a multi-factor test for Title VII harass-
ment claims, stating it has the potential for a mechanical applica-
tion that overlooks or underemphasizes the most important features
of the harassment inquiry.26  Consistent with other circuits,
however, the court in White did require that the environment be
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment, and that the victim establish a basis of
employer liability.
27
Adopting the standards set forth by the Supreme Court' in
1995, the Tenth Circuit, in Bolden v. PRC Inc.,2 9 stated that for a
plaintiff to bring a claim of racial discrimination in violation of
Title VII, it must be shown that, under the totality of the circum-
stances, (1) the harassment was pervasive and severe enough to
alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, and (2) the
harassment was racial or stemmed from racial animus.3
1. Membership in a Protected Class.--Harassment that is not
based on race, gender, religion, or national origin is not action-
able.31 Therefore, in order to bring a claim under Title VII, a
plaintiff must establish that he or she was harassed due to his or
her membership in a protected class.
3 2
In order to show membership in a protected class, a
plaintiff must show that race was a "substantial factor" in the
harassment and that the plaintiff would not have been treated in
24. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482.
25. No. 97-3056, 1998 WL 124062 (7th Cir. March 17, 1998).
26. See id. at *6.
27. See id.
28. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
29. 43 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1995).
30. See id. at 551; see also Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1432 (10th Cir.
1998).
31. See Freeman v. Kansas, No. 97-2531-JWL, 1998 WL 259899 (D.Kan. April 10, 1998).
32. See Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[g]eneral
harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable").
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the same manner if he or she was a non-minority.33  In other
words, the plaintiff must prove that the treatment he or she
received differed from that received by other similarly situated
individuals. 4  The plaintiff's own speculations, conclusions, and
self-serving assertions, however, are insufficient to establish the
basis of harassment as racially motivated.35
2. The Harassment Must be Pervasive or Severe.-The
Supreme Court in Meritor held that in order for a claim of
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and
create an abusive working environment.36 Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit has noted that "[p]ervasiveness and severity are indepen-
dent grounds on which to support violations."37
In order to determine whether an environment is hostile or
abusive a court must look at all of the circumstances. The Supreme
Court in Harris set forth a number of factors relevant to the
examination of the circumstances: (1) the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4)
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.38 The Court noted further that while the effect on
an employee's psychological well-being is relevant to determining
whether he or she actually found the environment abusive,
psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken
into account, but is not required.39
To fulfill the "pervasive or severe" burden, a plaintiff must
show more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity.'
Rather than sporadic racial slurs, there must be "a steady barrage
33. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citing
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d at 1485 (3d Cir. 1990)).
34. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1478 (citing Kuhar v. Greensburg-Salem Sch. Dist., 616
F.2d 676, 677 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980)).
35. See White v. The Money Store, No. 97-3056, 1998 WL 124062, at *6 (7th Cir. 1998).
36. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
37. Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 67).
38. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
39. See id.




of opprobrious racial comments."'" Additionally, the Supreme
Court has noted that a mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet
that engenders offensive feelings in an employee does not affect the
conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to
violate Title VII.
42
Although courts have set forth standards in determining
whether harassment is sufficiently pervasive and severe so as to be
actionable, there is no bright line distinction between what is or is
not pervasive and what is or is not severe. Courts must look at the
totality of the circumstances and must determine whether this
element is met on a case-by-case basis.43 For example, in Witt v.
Roadway Express, the Tenth Circuit held that two instances of
racial animus during a two-year period did not, as a matter of law,
constitute "a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.""
The court noted that although this conduct was socially inexcusable,
it involved merely a few isolated incidents of racial enmity, which
do not satisfy the pervasiveness standard and which the law cannot
redress.45 Likewise, in Bolden, the Tenth Circuit held that only
two overtly racial comments and one arguably racial remark over
the course of the plaintiff's eight years of employment did not
constitute pervasive conduct and were, therefore, insufficient to be
inactionable. 4
In contrast, in Smith v. Norwest Fin. Acceptance,4" which
involved a claim of sexual harassment, a combination of six
discriminatory statements over twenty-three months was held to be
sufficiently pervasive.48 The court noted further that while some
courts tend to count the number of events that occur over time to
determine pervasiveness, "the word 'pervasive' is not a counting
41. Id.; see also Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that
merely casual,accidental, or sporadic offensive comments cannot sustain aracial harassment
claim).
42. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1972)).
43. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
44. Witt, 136 F.3d at 1432 (citing Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1995));
see also Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 863 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that
a hostile work environment claim must demonstrate a continuous period of harassment and
that two comments do not create a hostile atmosphere).
45. See Witt, 136 F.3d at 1432.
46. See Bolden, 43 F.3d at 551.
47. 129 F.3d 1408 (10th Cir. 1997).
48. See id. at 1415.
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measure."49 Rather than relying on the number of incidents as
the only determinative measure, the finder of fact must utilize a
broader contextual analysis, considering the number, sequence, and
timing of the conduct, as well as the environmental factors that are
imposed by each instance of discriminatory behavior.5"
In Harris, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging
harassment must prove that the harassing conduct was severe or
pervasive enough to create both a subjectively and objectively
hostile or abusive working environment.51 In order to satisfy the
subjective standard, the victim must actually perceive the environ-
ment to be abusive; otherwise, the conduct has not actually altered
the conditions of the victim's employment.5 2 Relevant facts that
are related to whether or not conduct was subjectively abusive
include: (1) whether the plaintiff complained about the alleged
conduct, and, if so, when the complaint was made; (2) whether the
plaintiff discussed the problem with others; (3) what the plaintiff's
physical and emotional state was after the alleged harassment; (4)
to what degree the plaintiff participated in the conduct; and (5)
whether there was any change in the plaintiff's job performance.53
For example, in Smith, the Tenth Circuit stated that the subjective
component was sufficiently established by the plaintiff's testimony,
which reflected that the defendant's comments were intolerable,
publicly made, and caused humiliation and a loss of self-respect. 4
In contrast, in Witt, the Tenth Circuit held that the harassing
comments complained of were not subjectively severe when the
plaintiff admitted that he "shrugged it off and walked away.,
55
The objective standard is satisfied when the discriminatory
conduct creates an environment that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive.56 Relevant facts that may refute objective
hostility include: (1) the plaintiff's inability to remember the
particular facts or details of the alleged conduct; and (2) the
plaintiff's admissions that others might disagree about the level of
offensiveness or the sexual/racial nature of the conduct." For
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
52. See id.
53. See Carey, supra note 5, at 27 (citations omitted).
54. See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1413.
55. Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
56. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
57. See Carey, supra note 5, at 27 (citations omitted).
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example, in applying the objective standard, the court in Smith
relied on the testimony of employees who worked with the
plaintiff.5 8 These witnesses stated that the defendant's conduct
was sexually inappropriate, offensive, and intimidating; that the
conduct had an impact on the office; and that the remarks had an
obvious effect on the plaintiff's work.5" The court found this
evidence to be sufficient to support the court's conclusion that a
reasonable person would find the harassment severe and the work
environment therefore hostile or abusive.6'
In applying the objective standard to Witt, however, the court
noted that this standard is not met when a remark "merely
engenders offensive feelings in an employee.",61  A court must
consider the nature and context of the incident, such as whether the
remark was inadvertently overheard rather than directed at the
victim, which indicates a lower degree of animosity and severity,
and whether the harasser apologized for the violation.62
B. Interference With the Plaintiffs Work Performance
A victim of harassment does not need to prove that his or her
tangible productivity has declined; instead, the harassment must
merely make it more difficult for the victim to do the job.63 The
58. See Smith, 129 F.3d at 1413.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Witt, 136 F.3d at 1433.
62. See id.; see also Standifer v. General Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers Union No.
460, No. CIV.A. 97-2037-GTV, 1998 WL 229553 (D. Kan. April 13, 1998). In Standifer, the
court noted in dicta that it is "highly possible" that racial epithets yelled in the context of a
labor dispute might be characterized as objectively reasonable. See id. at *6 n.5. The court
cited to Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), for the proposition that
" '[the real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by
a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.' " Id. at *6 n.5.
Furthermore, the court agreed with the union's assertion that "a picket line is not an ice-
cream social, and Emily Post hardly dictates the manner of behavior." See id.
63. See Flom v. Waste Management, Inc., No. 95 C 1924, 1997 WL 137174, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. March 24, 1997) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)). The Supreme Court in Harris stated that an abusive work environment, even
one that does not affect the employee's psychological well-being, can and usually will detract
from the employee's job performance, discourage the employee from remaining on the job,
or keep the employee from advancing in his or her career. See Harris, 510 U.S, at 22.
Furthermore, "even without regard to these tangible effect, the very fact that the discrimi-
natory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to
employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad
rule of workplace equality." Id.
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Supreme Court has stated that psychological harm is unnecessary
for a victim to bring a successful claim for harassment.' Title VII
"comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous
breakdown., 65 As long as the environment would reasonably be
perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need
for it also to be psychologically injurious. 66 The Court in Harris
stated that the requirement that the environment be altered by
pervasive or severe conduct "takes a middle path between making
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury."67
C. Employer Liability Prior to Faragher v. Boca Raton and
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
Prior to the recent decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, courts
have struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer
liability for discriminatory harassment by their employees. 68
Based on Supreme Court precedent rejecting strict liability and
directing courts to rely on agency principles for guidance in
determining employer liability, courts looked to the provisions of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 219, and defined
three bases of employer liability.69 An employer was held liable:
(1) if the conduct violating Title VII occurred within the harasser's
scope of employment; (2) if the employer knew, or should have
known, about the violation and failed to respond in a reasonable
manner; or (3) if the harasser acted with apparent authority or was
aided in violating the statute by virtue of his or her agency
relationship with the employer.7" The Supreme Court's decisions
in Faragher and Ellerth, however, if applicable to other forms of
64. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 21.
68. See Reynolds, v. CSX Transp., 115 F.3d 860, 866-67 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2282 (1998).
69. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). The Court stated
that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of an employer, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for
which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible." Id. The Court held that the
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for
harassment by their supervisors. See id.
70. See Wright-Simmons v. The City of Oklahoma City, No. 96-6203, 1998 WL 614414
(10th Cir. Sept. 15, 1998).
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harassment under Title VII, will mark a significant change in the
law developed by lower courts.
D. The New Standards Established For Employer Liability:
Faragher v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth
Pursuant to the decisions of Faragher and Ellerth, there are
several ways in which an employer can be held liable. The
Supreme Court in Ellerth set forth two categories of employer
liability: (1) an employer is subject to liability for the torts of its
employees committed while acting in the scope of their employ-
ment;" and (2) in limited circumstances, an employer may be held
liable for the torts of its employees committed while acting outside
the scope of their employment.72
1. Employees Acting Within the Scope of Their Employ-
ment.-"While early decisions absolved employers of liability for
the intentional torts of their employees, the law now imposes
liability where the employee's 'purpose, however misguided, is
wholly or in part to further the master's business.' "" The Su-
preme Court has directed lower courts to rely on agency principles
for guidance in determining employer liability.74 Accordingly,
conduct of an employee is within the scope of employment if (1) it
is of the kind he is employed to perform; (2) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (3) it is actuated, at
least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer, and (4) if force
is intentionally used by the employee against another, the use of
force is not unforeseeable by the employer.75
71. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2266 (1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 219(1)).
72. See id. at 2267.
73. Id. at 2266 (quoting W. KEETON, ET AL., § 70, p.505 (5th ed. 1984)).
74. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(1) (1957). In order for an
employee's conduct to be within the scope of employment, it must be of the same general
nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct authorized. See id. § 229. In
determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is similar or incidental to
the conduct authorized so as to be within the scope of employment, the following factors are
to be considered: (1) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such employees; (2)
the time, place, and purpose of the act; (3) the previous relations between the employer and
employee; (4) the extent to which the business of the employer is apportioned between
different employees; (5)whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the employer or,
if within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any employee; (6) whether or not the
1999]
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Despite the fact that in most cases harassment is not consid-
ered to be conduct within the scope of employment because the
harasser usually acts for personal motives and to serve his or her
own interests, 76 the Supreme Court has suggested limited circum-
stances in which an employer may be held liable. For example, in
Ellerth, the Supreme Court cited to the decision of Sims v.
Montgomery County Commission77 for the proposition that there
are instances in which an employee engages in unlawful discrimina-
tion with the purpose, mistaken or otherwise, to serve the employ-
er.78 In Sims, the court held that a supervisor acted in the scope
of his employment where the employer had a policy of discouraging
women from seeking advancement and sexual harassment was a
way of furthering that policy.79 Additionally, in Faragher, the
Supreme Court noted that "a supervisor might discriminate racially
in job assignments in order to placate the prejudice pervasive in the
labor force.,
80
2. Employees Acting Outside the Scope of Employment.-An
employer may also be held liable for the torts of its employees
committed while acting outside the scope of their employment.
81
Conduct of an employee is not within the scope of his or her
employment "if it is different in kind from that authorized, far
beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by
a purpose to serve the [employer]." 82 For example, in Jamison v.
Whiley,83 a supervisor's unfair criticism of a subordinate's work in
employer has reason to expect that such an act will be done; (7) the similarity in quality of
the act done to the act authorized; (8) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm
is done has been provided by the employer to the employee; (9) the extent of departure from
the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and (10) whether or not the act
is seriously criminal. See id.
76. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266. The Court also noted that "[t]he general rule is that
sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conducted within the scope of employment." Id.
at 2267; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2286-87 (1998).
77. 766 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
78. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2266.
79. See id. (citing Sims, 766 F. Supp. at 1075).
80. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2288 (1993).
81. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1957). An act of an employee is
not within the scope of his or her employment "if it is done with no intention to perform it
as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he [or she] is employed." Id. § 235
(1958).
83. 14 F.3d 222 (C.A.4 1994).
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retaliation for rejecting his sexual advances was not found to be
within the supervisor's scope of employment.'
The Supreme Court has held that an employer may be held
liable for the torts of its employees committed while acting outside
the scope of their employment when (1) the employer itself was
negligent or reckless; (2) the employee purported to act or speak
on behalf of the employer, and there was reliance upon apparent
authority; or (3) the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relationship.85
First, "an employer is liable when the tort is attributable to the
employer's own negligence."86  Although an employee's harass-
ment may be outside the scope of his or her employment because
the conduct was for personal motives, an employer can be liable
where its own negligence is a cause of the harassment.87  An
employer is negligent if it knew or should have known about the
harassing conduct and failed to stop it.88 An employee can show
that the employer had knowledge of the harassment by either
proving that he or she complained to higher management about the
harassment or by demonstrating the pervasiveness of the harass-
ment, which gives rise to the inference of constructive knowl-
edge.89
Second, an employer may be held liable when the employee
purported to act or to speak on behalf of the employer, and there
84. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Jamison, 14 F.3d at 237). The Court in Ellerth
also cited to the Restatement for additional examples of conduct falling outside the scope
of employment. See id. at 2266. For example, it noted that a tort committed while acting
purely from personal ill will is not within the scope of employment. See id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235, illus. 2 (1957)). Additionally, a tort that is
committed in retaliation for failing to pay the employee a bribe is not within the scope of
employment. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235, illus. 3 (1957)).
85. See id. at 2267 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(b)(d) (1957)).
Additionally, the Court noted that section 210(2) of the Restatement also provides for
liability in two other circumstances: (1) when the employer intended the conduct or
consequences, such as direct liability when the employer acts with tortious intent, and
indirect liability when the employee's high rank in the organization makes him or her the
employer's alter ego; and (2) when an employee's conduct violated a non-delegable duty of





89. See Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904 (11 Cir. 1988)
(citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 Cir. 1980)).
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was reliance upon apparent authority.90 "Apparent authority" is
a basis for liability "where the agent purports to exercise a power
which he or she does not have."9' There are two requirements for
apparent authority: (1) manifestation by a person that another is his
agent; and (2) reasonable reliance by a third person.9 2  The
Supreme Court has noted that if it is alleged that there is a false
impression that the harasser was a supervisor, when in fact he or
she was not, the victim's mistaken conclusion must be a reasonable
one in order to impose liability on the employer.93
Third, an employer may be held liable when the employee was
aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency
relationship. 94  This "aided in the agency relation" standard
applies to both quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment
harassment; however, the latter gives an employer the opportunity
to assert and prove an affirmative defense to liability.95
Courts have recognized that vicarious liability is clearly
appropriate when a supervisor takes a tangible action against an
employee.96 In order for an employer to be held liable for such
quid pro quo harassment, a supervisor must take a tangible adverse
employment action against an employee, using the agency relation
to inflict the injury.97 A tangible employment action is a signifi-
cant change in an employee's employment status, such as hiring,
firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.9 "Tangible employment actions are the means by which
the supervisor brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on
90. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267; see also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290.
91. Id.
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957). The Supreme Court failed
to mention that according to the Restatement, "[aipparent authority results from a manifes-
tation by a person that another is his agent, the manifestation being made to a third person
and not, as when authority is created, to the agent." Id. § 8 cmt. a. The manifestation of
the employer may be made directly to a third person or may be made to the community by
signs, advertising, or continuously employing the agent. Id. § 8 cmt. b.
93. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8, cmt.
c (stating that apparent authority exists only to the extent that it is reasonable for the third
person dealing with the agent to believe that the agent is authorized)).
94. See id. at 2267; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290 (1998).
95. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.





subordinates."99  Tangible employment decisions affecting the
employment status of an employee "fall within the special province
of the supervisor" and require "an official act of the enterprise, a
company act."100 Therefore, "a tangible employment action taken
by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the
employer.""1 1 Thus, an affirmative defense is not available when
the supervisor's harassment results in a tangible employment action,
such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
10 2
Additionally, an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for hostile work environment created by a
supervisor with either immediate or successively higher authority
over the employee.10 3 When there is no tangible employment
action taken, however, employer liability is not automatic, and a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence."
The availability of an affirmative defense for an employer against
liability marks a significant change in law under Title VII harass-
ment claims. The affirmative defense consists of two necessary
elements: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent
and to correct promptly any harassing behavior; and (2) the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm.105
In Faragher, the Eleventh Circuit held that the harassing
supervisors were not acting within the scope of their employment
and that their agency relationship with their employer did not
facilitate the harassment.10 6 The Supreme Court reversed and
held that an employer is vicariously liable for discrimination by a
supervisor, subject to an affirmative defense that looks to the
reasonableness of both the employer's and the victim's conduct.0 7
When evaluating the reasonableness of the employer's conduct,
the Court noted that the harassing supervisors were given "virtually
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2269.
101. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2269.
102. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998) (citing Ellerth, 118
S. Ct. at 2269).
103. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; see also Faragher, S. Ct. at 2293.
104. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
105. See id.




unchecked authority" over their subordinates, which allowed them
to directly control and to supervise all aspects of the victim's day-
to-day activities. 108 Further, the victim and her co-workers were
completely isolated from the employer's higher management. 10 9
Additionally, the Court noted that the employer failed to communi-
cate its policy against harassment to its employees, that its officials
made no attempt to keep track of the supervisors' conduct, and
that the employer's policy excluded any assurance that the
harassing supervisors could be bypassed in registering com-
plaints.1 Accordingly, the Court held the employer vicariously
liable for the harassment by its supervisors in view of its failure to
exercise reasonable care to prevent harassing behavior.11'
Although the standards for this affirmative defense were
derived from earlier decisions of courts of appeals, 2 the holdings
in Faragher and Ellerth set forth new law with respect to the
terminology. Regarding "reasonable care," as required by the first
element of the affirmative defense, the Supreme Court indicated
that:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharass-
ment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every
instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable
to the employment circumstances may appropriately be
addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the
defense. 113
Additionally, with regard to the second requirement that the
employee acted unreasonably, the Court stated:
[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the correspond-
ing obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to
showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure
provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
108. See id. at 2293.
109. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Courts have previously held that an employer could insulate itself from liability if
the plaintiff was aware of the employer's policy against discrimination, and the procedures
under the policy were sufficiently effective in ending the harassment. See Bouton v. BMW
of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986)); see also Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1180 (2d
Cir. 1996) (holding that an employer policy must provide a reasonable avenue of complaint
to avoid liability).
113. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
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normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the
second element of the defense. 4
Because the Supreme Court did not establish absolute guidelines
for evaluating "reasonable care" and "unreasonable" failure to
complain, these terms are likely to be developed further in future
litigation. There is one thing for certain-in order to insulate
themselves from liability, employers should take all the possible
steps and precautions to prevent discriminatory harassment in the
workplace before it occurs.
115
III. Analysis
A. Faragher and Ellerth Apply Equally to Racial and Sexual
Harassment Cases
Faragher and Ellerth involved claims for sexual harassment,
and the Supreme Court was silent on the issue of whether or not
the new standards for employer liability set forth in these cases also
apply to other forms of harassment under Title VII. In the past,
courts have applied the same principles to workplace harassment
claims regardless of whether the claim was based on race or
sex.
116
The analogy between racial harassment and sexual harassment
is found in Meritor, the first case of discriminatory workplace
harassment to reach the Supreme Court."7  In Meritor, "the
Court suggested that sexual harassment was analogous to other
forms of discriminatory harassment such as harassment on the basis
of race or ethnic characteristics.""' In finding a cause of action
under Title VII for sexual harassment that creates a hostile
workplace, the Court referred with approval to cases recognizing a
cause of action for a hostile work environment based on race."9
The Supreme Court indicated its "belief in the appropriateness of
114. Id.
115. See discussion infra Part III.E.
116. See Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co., 80 F.3d 1107,
1118 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 169 (1996); see also West v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 n.7 (3d Cit. 1995); supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
117. See L. Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 823 (1997).
118. Id.




the analogy between the two types of harassment" by citing to
Henson v. Dundee12 for the proposition that:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environ-
ment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier
to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to
racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest racial epithets.''
Although the Meritor Court drew the initial analogy between
racial harassment and sexual harassment, it imposed stringent
burdens on employees alleging sexual harassment and remained
silent on the issue of whether these standards also applied to other
forms of harassment under Title VII. 22 Subsequently, however,
the Supreme Court suggested the appropriateness of a single
standard for evaluating claims of workplace harassment.'23 In
Harris, the Court "discussed in common terms 'a work environment
abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin' without any hint that different standards might be
applicable to these different types of harassment." '24 Additional-
ly, the Court did not expressly identify by name the nature of the
harassment alleged.' Justice Ginsburg, however, was explicit on
this issue in her concurring opinion.'26 In discussing a lower court
decision in a racial harassment case, Justice Ginsburg noted that
the fact that a case concerns race-based discrimination does not
alter the analysis of the harassment claim. 27 Justice Ginsburg
explicitly took the position that the same standards are applicable
to racial harassment and sexual harassment claims when she stated
120. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
121. Hebert, supra note 117 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at
902)).
122. See id. at 826.
123. See id.
124. See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 22).
125. See id. Justice O'Connor's opinion makes reference to a "discriminatorily 'abusive
work environment' " and to " 'abusive work environment' harassment," but never "uses the
term 'sexual harassment' or gives any indication that the nature of the harassment alleged
has any bearing on the issue before the Court." Herbert, supra note 117, at 826-27.




that " 'Title VII declares discriminatory practices based on race,
gender, religion, or national origin equally unlawful.' ,128
The Supreme Court has even looked to the standards estab-
lished in racial harassment claims in order to hold that there is a
cause of action for sexual harassment against an individual of the
same sex under Title VII. 129 The Court reasoned that "Title VII's
prohibition of discrimination 'because of ... sex' protects men as
well as women""13 and that "in the related context of racial
discrimination in the workplace this Court has rejected any
conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate
against members of his own race."'31  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that there was no justification for a barring a claim for
sexual harassment under Title VII merely because the plaintiff and
the defendant are of the same sex.
13 2
Courts have been divided on the issue of whether analogies
between race and sex are appropriate in evaluating workplace
harassment claims.133 As a result of the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions, the question again arises of whether or not the standards
applied in racial and sexual harassment claims are one in the same.
1. Sexual Harassment Claims Should Not Enjoy More Favor-
able Legal Treatment Than Racial Harassment Claims.-Ellerth
produced a strong dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he
expressed his opinion that because of the Faragher and Ellerth
decisions, sexual harassment cases now enjoy more favorable legal
treatment than racial harassment cases and that these two cases
mark a divergence in the law of racial and sexual harassment.3
Justice Thomas argued that the new rules for employer liability are
not as clear as they seem, and that the Court provided "shocking
128. Id. (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 25-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citations and footnote
omitted)). It should be noted, however, that in the case to which Justice Ginsburg referred,
Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), the Sixth Circuit explicitly
took the position that the standards for racial harassment and sexual harassment were
different. See id.
129. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
130. Id. at 1000 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 682 (1982)).
131. Id. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977)).
132. See Diana P. Scott, Latest Developments in Sexual Discrimination and Harassment,
SD09 ALI-ABA 35, 48-49 (July 6, 1998).
133. See id. at 829.




little guidance" about how employers can avoid liability.135
Additionally, he stated that the Court was being tougher on sexual
harassment than it was on racial harassment.
136
Justice Thomas noted that, years before sexual harassment was
recognized, courts considered whether, and when, a racially hostile
work environment could violate Title VII.1 37  Further, he ex-
plained that the "primary goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
to eradicate race discrimination and that the statute's ban on sex
discrimination was added as an eleventh-hour amendment in an
effort to kill the bill.
1 38
Justice Thomas cited various authorities to establish that
Courts of Appeals have relied on racial harassment cases when
analyzing early claims of discrimination based upon a supervisor's
sexual harassment. 139  For example, he noted that the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in holding that a
work environment poisoned by a supervisor's sexually stereotyped
insults and demeaning propositions could itself violate Title VII,
used the opinion of Judge Goldberg in Rogers,'140 a racial harass-
ment case, as its principle authority.14' Additionally, the Supreme
Court relied on Rogers when it recognized a cause of action under
Title VII for sexual harassment in Meritor. 
142
Justice Thomas stated that sexual harassment is not a free-
standing tort, but a form of employment discrimination, and that,
as such, it should be treated no differently, and certainly no better,
135. Id. at 2274 (1998).
136. See id.
137. See id at 2271.
138. Id. at 2271 n.1 (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (C.A.D.C. 1977)).
139. See Ellerth, 118 U.S. at 2272 n.2.
140. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972).
141. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2272 n.2 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944
(C.A.D.C. 1981); see also Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (C.A.11 1982)). In Bundy,
the court stated that "[riacial slurs, though intentional and directed at individuals, may still
be just verbal insults, yet they too may create Title VII liability." Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945.
The court then asked "[h]ow then can sexual harassment, which injects the most demeaning
sexual stereotypes into the general work environment and which always represents an
intentional assault on an individual's intermost privacy not be illegal?" Id. at 945. By
recognizing that the effects of sexually harassing conduct can be as damaging to women as
racially harassing conduct is to members of minority groups, the court concluded that both
types of conduct should be subject to the same regulation and prohibition. See Herbert,
supra note 117, at 829-830.
142. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2272 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986)).
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than the other forms of harassment under Title VII. 14 3  He
decided that he would restore parallel treatment of employer
liability for racial and sexual harassment and hold an employer
liable only if the employer is truly at fault.144 Justice Thomas
further expressed the opinion that the Supreme Court's holding
guarantees one result, that "[t]here will be more and more litigation
to clarify applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitio-
ners and the courts have long been begging for guidance., 145 He
further stated that "[i]t thus boggles the mind that the Court can
claim that its holding will effect 'Congress' intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context.' ,146
Applying these standards of employer liability only to claims
of sexual harassment can have serious repercussions. If there are
different standards governing employer liability under Title VII
depending on which form of harassment a victim alleges, a minority
woman who is both racially and sexually harassed may have to
satisfy two different standards for employer liability and may end
up being successful with regard to one claim and unsuccessful with
regard to the other, even though she was harassed equally because
of her race and sex. This may affect a minority women's decision
to fully vindicate her rights under Title VII because she may
choose to claim only one form of harassment, either racial or
sexual, depending on which claim is likely to be more successful.
This is only one justification in support of Justice Thomas' position
for maintaining "parallel treatment" of employer liability for racial
and sexual harassment.
There are other reasons for judging claims of discriminatory
harassment under a single standard and not allowing sexual
harassment claims to enjoy more favorable legal treatment. Under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
states that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," the standard of
review is stricter for race discrimination than it is for sex discrimi-
nation, making racial classifications more difficult to pass constitu-
tional muster.1 47 Race, and not sex, is considered to be a suspect
143. See id. at 2275.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 2274.
146. Id. (citing the majority opinion at 2270).
147. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Dorsten v.
Lapeer County General Hosp., 521 F. Supp. 944 (U.S.D.C. 1981). Racial classifications are
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classification and is held to a higher level of scrutiny under equal
protection analysis. 148  This fact supports Justice Thomas' view
that the courts should not be tougher on sexual harassment claims
than it is on racial harassment claims.
While the Equal Protection Clause grants constitutional
protection and Title VII grants statutory protection, both have the
same objective-to prevent unlawful discrimination against
individuals. Since racial discrimination claims are held to a higher
degree of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment than gender
discrimination claims, it seems only logical that all cases involving
racial prejudice, including employment harassment cases, should be
subjected to a stricter standard of review and enjoy more favorable
legal treatment. If only sexual harassment cases are subjected to
the standards established in Faragher and Ellerth, they will enjoy
more favorable legal treatment than claims based on race, which is
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. It will be easier for a
minority to succeed in a race discrimination claim than it will be for
a woman to succeed in a gender discrimination claim under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however,
under Title VII, it will be easier for a woman to succeed in a sexual
harassment claim than it will be for a minority to succeed in a
racial harassment claim. Not only is this contradiction against legal
thought in general, it is morally unconscionable.
It should not be easier for a white woman bringing a sexual
harassment claim to succeed than it is for a black woman bringing
a racial harassment claim. The entire black race has been, and
continues to be, subjected to racial prejudice, dating back to the
days of slavery. Moreover, although black people have established
rights and are afforded "equal protection of the laws," racial bias
subject to strict scrutiny with the purpose of eliminating "illegitimate uses of race by assuring
that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool." City of Richmond, 488 U.S. at 493. Additionally, this test "ensures that the
means chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." Id. Gender-
based classifications, however, are subjected to "special Constitutional scrutiny," which is a
"standard of review that is intermediate between the 'rational basis' test and the 'strict
scrutiny' test." Dorsten, 521 F. Supp. at 946. This test requires such gender-based
classifications to "bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental
objectives." Id.
148. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The highly suspect nature of classifications based on race,
nationality, or alienage is well established").
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still exists today, and statutory protection afforded to black people
and other minorities must be of the highest degree.
Although it is still held today that the standard of review is
stricter for race discrimination than it is for sex discrimination
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has been argued in the past
that sex and race should be treated equally for purposes of Equal
Protection analysis. 49 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the opinion for
the plurality sets forth the reasons of four Justices who concluded
that sex should be regarded as a suspect classification for purposes
of equal protection analysis.15 ° "These reasons center on our
Nation's 'long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination,' which
has been reflected in whole range of restrictions on the legal rights
of women ... ." The Frontiero Court believed that race and
sex should be treated the same:
since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility...
The Court cited to the language of Title VII, which makes it
unlawful to discriminate against any individual on the basis of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin to support
its conclusion that Congress has concluded that classifications based
upon sex are "inherently invidious" as are classifications based on
race and national origin.'53 Subsequent to Frontiero, however,
the Supreme Court has declined to hold that sex is a suspect class
for purposes of equal protection analysis.'54
For purposes of Title VII analysis, however, courts have, in the
past, applied the same principles to claims of racial and sexual
149. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
150. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684). The plurality noted that a "paternalistic
attitude became so firmly rooted in our national consciousness" that "our statute books
gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and...
throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was...
comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
685.
152. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
153. See id. at 687 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c)); see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 218
(citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975)).
154. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 218 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975)).
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harassment.'55 Dating back to Meritor, the first case of discrimi-
natory workplace harassment to reach the Supreme Court, it has
been common practice to analogize sexual harassment with racial
harassment.5 6 Applying equal standards is more acceptable than
applying more stringent standards to only sexual harassment cases.
As discussed, given the unfortunate history of racial discrimination
and the high level of scrutiny to which race discrimination claims
are held under the Equal Protection Clause, it is unacceptable for
courts to be tougher on sexual harassment cases. Therefore, in
accordance with tradition, courts should continue to recognize
equality between race and sex for purposes of Title VII analysis.
Additionally, if courts limit the applicability of Faragher and
Ellerth to sexual harassment cases, another inconsistency results.
In the past, when evaluating a hostile work environment claim,
courts have looked to cases involving both racial and sexual
harassment for guidance, regardless of what type of harassment was
being alleged before them. In other words, the case law governing
racial and sexual harassment has become intermingled. For
example, when evaluating the pervasiveness and severity of alleged
racial harassment, the Tenth Circuit in Witt relied extensively on
the law set forth by the Supreme Court in Meritor and Harris, both
of which were sexual harassment cases.157 In contrast, the Tenth
Circuit in Smith cited to Bolden, a racial discrimination case, when
evaluating the pervasiveness of alleged sexual harassment.
15 8
If Faragher and Ellerth apply only to sexual harassment cases,
courts deciding claims based on sex will be restricted to using this
case law as precedent when evaluating the existence of employer
liability, which is only one element needed to establish a hostile
work environment claim. They will, however, be able to refer to
the law established in both racial and sexual harassment cases when
determining whether the other elements needed to establish the
claim have been met, such as whether the conduct was severe or
pervasive or if the harassment interfered with the plaintiff's work
performance. Therefore, when determining the existence of
155. See Harrison v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co., 80 F.3d 1107,
1118 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 169 (1996); see also West v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995); supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text; discussion
supra Part III.A.
156. See Hebert, supra note 117, at 823.
157. See Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1432-1433 (10th Cir. 1998).
158. See Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance , 129 F.3d 1408, 1414 (10th Cir. 1997).
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employer liability, courts will hold sexual harassment claims to a
more stringent standard than racial harassment claims. When
determining whether the remaining elements of the sexual
harassment claim have been met, however, courts will use the same
standards that govern racial harassment cases. This inconsistency
should not be enforced. Under Title VII, a hostile work environ-
ment claim based on sex consists of the same elements as a hostile
work environment claim based on race. These elements, regardless
of what type of harassment is being alleged, should be evaluated
according to the same standards.
2. Courts Must Look to the Language in Faragher and Ellerth
for Guidance.-Until the Supreme Court rules on the issue of
whether the standards set forth in Faragher and Ellerth are
applicable to sexual harassment cases only, creating a divergence
in the law of racial and sexual harassment, one can only speculate
and look to the language in these cases for some direction. The
Supreme Court in Faragher noted that, since its decision in Meritor,
"Courts of Appeals have struggled to derive manageable standards
to govern employer liability for hostile environment harassment
perpetrated by supervisory employees., 159 It further stated that
it granted certiorari to address this divergence in the Courts of
Appeals' decisions.1" Because the Court did not explicitly state
that it was addressing the confusion in the law governing employer
liability in sexual harassment cases specifically, it can therefore be
reasonably inferred that the Court planned to address the diver-
gence in law regarding employer liability in hostile environment
harassment cases generally. Therefore, it appears that the Supreme
Court meant for these principles to apply equally to all forms of
harassment under Title VII. To do otherwise would be contrary to
the Court's intended goal of mending the divergence in the law. If
these standards are applicable only to sexual harassment cases,
there will be different standards for employer liability under Title
VII, depending on which form of harassment the plaintiff is
alleging. Thus, with regard to employer liability under Title VII,
there would be a divergence.
Additionally, in Faragher, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that in sexual harassment cases, Courts of Appeals have properly




looked to the standards developed in cases involving racial
harassment. 6' The Court noted that "[a]lthough racial and
sexual harassment will often take different forms, and standards
may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good sense
in seeking generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts
to actionable harassment." '162 These statements of the Supreme
Court provide added support for the proposition that the holdings
of Faragher and Ellerth are not limited to sexual harassment cases.
B. The Benefits of Analogizing Racial and Sexual Harassment
There are benefits of analogizing race and sex. Use of
analogies between race and sex "may help to clarify the discrimina-
tory nature of both types of harassment and may help decision-
makers to see the harmful effects of both types of activities.
163
Analogizing race and sex may aid employees who bring sexual
harassment claims. Decisionmakers may recognize the inappropri-
ateness of standards established for sexual harassment claims when
applying these standards to claims of racial harassment.a64 For
example, "[u]nderstanding that experiences of racial minorities
affect the way that they experience and perceive racially related
behavior might trigger awareness that women's perceptions are also
shaped by their experience of sexual conduct misplaced into the
workplace.', 16s Furthermore, the acknowledgement that one
incident of racially threatening behavior, such as hanging a noose
over a black employee's desk or burning a cross in his or her
presence, can create a racially hostile work environment, may help
decisionmakers to realize that a single incident of sexually offensive
behavior, such as the touching of a woman's breast against her will,
can permanently alter her work environment. 66
Using analogies between racial and sexual harassment may
also serve to form alliances that are useful in furthering the
interests of both women and minorities. 61 For example, white
women who are subjected to the humiliation and degrading effects
of sexual harassment may possibly understand the harm caused to
161. See id. at 2283 n.1.
162. Id.
163. Hebert, supra note 117, at 880.
164. Id. at 880.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 881.
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minorities by racial harassment.168 Furthermore, minority men
may be more capable of understanding the harm caused to women
by sexual harassment if they are faced with the comparison of that
behavior to their own experiences of racial harassment.'69
Additionally, as discussed previously, establishing different
standards for racial and sexual harassment may have serious
repercussions for a minority woman who is both racially and
sexually harassed.170 It has been argued that the interests of
black women are "harmed and marginalized" when race and sex
are treated as two different types of discrimination instead of
recognizing the intersection between the two. 171 A study of the
harassment of people subject to both racial and sexual harassment
provides added support for the proposition that courts should draw
analogies between race and sex when considering workplace
harassment claims, because those cases demonstrate the intercon-
nections and similarities between racial harassment and sexual
harassment. 172  For certain groups of people, such as black
women, harassment may not be just racial or just sexual in nature,
but instead may be a combination of both, so that the motivation
for that behavior cannot be properly attributed to only one type of
harassment.'73 A white man may be prejudiced against a black
woman because of her race, but may also sexually harass that
woman and use her gender as a means of intimidation. For
example, dating back to the days of slavery, American slave owners
used rape to terrorize and dominate black women. 74 Another
example is a black woman who receives a picture of racist pornog-
raphy on her desk. She is unlikely to draw a distinction between
the racial insult and the sexually offensive nature of the con-
duct. 175  If courts apply Faragher and Ellerth to only sexual
harassment claims, this woman will be faced with the task of
distinguishing between the racially motivated harassment and the
sexually motivated harassment and will have to establish a different
basis of employer liability for each claim. Because of the more
168. See Hebert, supra note 117, at 881.
169. See id.
170. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
171. See Hebert, supra note 117, at 881.
172. See id.
173. See id.




stringent standards established in Faragher and Ellerth, her sexual
harassment claim will receive more favorable legal treatment than
her racial harassment claim, and she will have a lesser chance of
succeeding on the latter even though both claims were the result of
one incident. This will be the unfortunate result of limiting the
applicability of Faragher and Ellerth to claims of sexual harassment
only and discontinuing the analogy between race and sex for
purposes of Title VII analysis.
C. Cases Decided Subsequent to Faragher and Ellerth
Subsequent to the Faragher and Ellerth decisions, courts have
been confronted with the task of determining whether or not to
apply the principles set forth in Faragher and Ellerth to other forms
of harassment. It appears that most courts believe that these new
standards are not limited to claims for sexual harassment. For
example, in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,176
which involved a claim for race discrimination under Title VII, the
Fifth Circuit stated that in adopting the new standards for employer
liability, the Supreme Court's purpose was apparently not to
announce a standard solely for sexual harassment claims.'
Rather, its purpose was " 'to accommodate the agency principles
of vicarious liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory
authority, as well as Title VII's equally basic policies of encourag-
ing forethought by employers and saving action by objecting
employees.' 178 The court therefore expressed the opinion that
the Supreme Court intended to apply these newly established
principles to all vicarious liability inquiries under Title VII directed
towards acts by supervisors, including those involving racial
discrimination.
1 79
The court looked further to the language in Faragher to find
support for the proposition that the Supreme Court did not intend
to limit its holdings to only sexual harassment cases. The court
noted that in Faragher, the Court stated its preference to "harmo-
nize the standards of what amounts to actionable harassment.' 180
Moreover, the court noted that the Supreme Court stated that its
176. No. 97-10685, 1998 WL 654810 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
177. See id. at *12.
178. Id. (quoting Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998)).
179. See id.
180. Id. (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 n.1 (1998)); see also
supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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obligation was to adapt agency principles to the practical objectives
of Title VII.181 Accordingly, the court found that even though
the case before them involved a racial discrimination claim, the
standards enunciated in Faragher and Ellerth were controlling. 82
Other courts have agreed with the Deffenbaugh-Williams
court's finding. In Wright-Simmons v. The City of Oklahoma
City,"' the Tenth Circuit also stated that although Faragher and
Ellerth involved sexual harassment, the principles established
therein applied with equal force to the case of racial harassment
before it.1" The court listed a number of reasons to support its
finding. First, it noted, as did the court in Deffenbaugh-Williams,
the Supreme Court's indication in Faragher of its preference for
harmonizing the standards applied in cases of racial and sexual
discrimination.1 85  Also, the court noted that Faragher and Ellerth
did not involve situations unique to sexual harassment cases, such
as quid pro quo6 harassment.187  Moreover, in the past, cases
have always reflected the belief that the employer-liability
standards are equivalent for racial and sexual harassment.188
Finally, the court noted that Faragher and Ellerth interpreted the
same statutory language as that before it-whether an institution
is an "employer" for purposes of Title VII.
189
In addition to the two cases discussed, other courts have cited
to the decisions of Faragher and Ellerth in cases involving claims
for racial harassment, as well as claims for national origin and
disability discrimination." For example, in Cully v. Milliman &
181. See 1998 WL 654810, at *12 (citing Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291 n.3).
182. See id.
183. No. 96-6203, 1998 WL 614414 (10th Cir. Sept. 15, 1998).
184. See id. at *7.
185. See id.
186. In a quid pro quo case of sexual harassment, the plaintiff is subjected to unwelcome
sexual behavior in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, and the
submission to the unwelcome advances is a condition, either express or implied, for receiving
job benefits, or the refusal to submit to the sexual demands results in a tangible job
detriment. See Carey, supra note 5, at 27 (citations omitted).
187. See Wright-Simmons, 1998 WL 614414, at *7.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See Cully v. Milliman & Robertson, Inc., No. 97 Civ.4346 CBM, 1998 WL 651057
(S.D.N.Y. September 22, 1998) (a racial harassment case); see also DiSanto v. McGraw-Hill,
Inc./Platt's Division, No. 97 Civ.1090 JGK, 1998 WL 474136 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1998)
(disability discrimination case); Edwards v. State of Connecticut Dep't of Transp., No.
3:97CV01046 (GLG), 1998 WL 652098 (D. Conn September 17, 1998) (race and gender
discrimination case); Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., No. 3:94-0048, 1998 WL 546852
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Robertson, Inc.,"' a racial harassment case, the court cited to
Faragher for the proposition that the "[s]tandards are the same for
racial and sexual harassment."
In contrast, in Donald v. Benson Motor Co. Inc.,192 which
involved a claim for racial harassment, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana noted in a footnote that according to
the dissent in Ellerth, the Supreme Court has carved out different
standards for employer liability depending on whether the harass-
ment claim is sexual or racial in nature.' 93 The court further
stated that "at this time there is no indication that these decisions
will be extended to the area of racial discrimination., 194 Whether
or not other courts will follow the belief expressed by the Donald
court remains to be seen in future litigation.
By failing to explicitly inform lower courts of whether its
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth are applicable to only sexual
harassment claims or to other categories of harassment under Title
VII as well, the Supreme Court left the door wide open for lower
courts to decide for themselves. If some courts follow Donald and
decide that Faragher and Ellerth are limited to sexual harassment
cases only, and other courts do not, a split in authority will result
and a divergence in the law governing employer liability under
Title VII will occur, which is precisely what the Supreme Court
intended to avoid by deciding Faragher.
D. Employer Responsibility Under Faragher and Ellerth
1. Employers Must Exercise Reasonable Care to Prevent
Harassment in the Workplace.-In Faragher and Ellerth, the
Supreme Court held that an employer can be held liable for the
harassing conduct of its supervisors, subject to an affirmative
defense that may be raised by the employer. 95 In order for the
affirmative defense to be met, the employer must prove that it
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing
(M.D. Tenn. July 13, 1998) (race discrimination case); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue, No. 97
CIV.6385 (CLB), 1998 WL 388971 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1998) (national origin discrimination
case).
191. 1998 WL 651057, at **6 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275,
2283-84 (1998)).
192. No. CIV.A.97-1734, 1998 WL 387715 (E.D.La. July 9, 1998).
193. See id. at *7 n.3.
194. Id.
195. See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293; see also discussion supra Part II.F.2.
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conduct and that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use existing
procedures provided by the employer." The Supreme Court did
not explicitly address what exactly is expected from employers to
meet the requirements of this affirmative defense. Justice Thomas,
however, did state his criticisms.
Justice Thomas noted in his opinion that "sexual harassment
is simply not something that employers can wholly prevent without
taking extraordinary measures-constant video and audio surveil-
lance, for example-that would revolutionize the workplace in a
manner incompatible with free society."197 He concluded, there-
fore, that the most employers can be charged with is a duty to act
reasonably under the circumstances. 98 Accordingly, he stated his
belief that the standard of employer liability should be the same in
both racial harassment claims and sexual harassment claims; "[a]n
employer should be liable if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that
the employer was negligent in permitting the supervisor's conduct
to occur." 199
Although Justice Thomas may be correct when he states that
"extraordinary measures" would be needed in order to "wholly
prevent" sexual harassment in the workplace, it does not appear
that the Supreme Court expects this type of absolute prevention.
In Faragher, the Court noted the employer's failure "to disseminate
its sexual harassment policy" to its employees and to make any
attempt "to keep track" of the conduct of its supervisors.0
Additionally, the Supreme Court indicated the importance of a
formal policy against harassment with sensible complaint proce-
dures." ' The Court makes no reference to a requirement of
constant surveillance, such as audio and video recording. There-
fore, one can infer from the language in Faragher that the Supreme
Court does not expect employers to "revolutionize the workplace"
in order to "wholly prevent" harassment. Rather, the Court
expects that employers exercise reasonable care to prevent
harassing behavior, whether it be sexual or racial in nature, by
effectively implementing and communicating a policy against
harassment.
196. See id.
197. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2273.
198. See id.





On the other hand, because the Supreme Court's decisions left
so many unanswered questions, it is possible that "reasonable care"
requires that extraordinary measures be implemented. As
mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court failed to establish absolute
definitions and clear guidelines for evaluating the "reasonable care"
standard. The Court did not explain what is sufficient behavior by
employers to meet the requirements of the affirmative defense.
Although the Court did stress the value of having effective
harassment policies in place,2"2 it did not give any indication as to
how detailed these policies must be or whether training or other
protective measures are needed in order to meet the requirements
of this defense. Furthermore, what is sufficient to demonstrate that
an employee failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer was not clarified.
Therefore, the door is left open for the argument that this
standard requires employers to implement such extraordinary
measures in order to prevent sexual harassment because without
these measures an employer cannot keep track of its supervisors'
behavior. An employer's failure to exercise complete control over
its supervisors' conduct may fall short of reasonable care. This
argument can also be raised with regard to racial harassment cases,
because it would be virtually impossible for an employer to monitor
every action of its supervisors to prevent racial prejudice in the
workplace without taking extraordinary measures such as constant
surveillance. The issue of whether extraordinary measures are
needed is a question left unanswered and is likely to be developed
in future litigation.
2. Preventive Measures For Employers to Take In Order to
Protect Themselves From Liability.-As discussed previously, the
Supreme Court established an affirmative defense that may be
raised by an employer if the employer can prove that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing conduct and
that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use existing procedures
provided by the employer.2 °3 Faragher and Ellerth increase the
importance of improving anti-harassment programs by implement-
ing effective harassment policies and promptly investigating
202. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.




complaints. The most effective way for an employer to avoid
liability is to take steps to prevent harassment in the workplace
before it occurs. Employers must develop an effective written
policy that strongly communicates that the employers' will have
zero tolerance for harassment. This policy should convey the
following information to employees: (1) a broad definition of
prohibited conduct; (2) a statement that offenders will be subject
to appropriate discipline, including discharge; (3) a statement that
encourages employees who feel victimized by harassment to report
the offensive conduct; (4) a statement that requires employees and
supervisors to report any offensive conduct that they experience or
witness; (5) a statement that provides assurance that an employee
who reports harassment will not be retaliated against, and (6) a
statement that indicates that all reports of harassment will be
promptly and thoroughly investigated and that prompt remedial
action will be taken if the employer concludes that harassment has
taken place.' °
These written anti-harassment policies should be placed in
employee handbooks and visibly posted throughout the workplace.
Additionally, employers can require employees to sign a document,
acknowledging that they are aware of these policies. Employers
may also implement harassment awareness programs and training
sessions in order to help employees understand the type of conduct
prohibited under the anti-harassment policies. Furthermore, a
company should provide several avenues for employees to file
complaints, such as through a human resources department or a
hotline in order to avoid relying on supervisors who may be the
root of the problem to take corrective action. Employers should
also provide employees with the option of speaking to a man or a
woman in order to make it easier and more comfortable for
employees to voice their complaints.
Employers should give complaints of harassment top priority.
Complaints should be investigated thoroughly and resolved quickly.
Although there is no requirement in the affirmative defense that
employees be one hundred percent satisfied with the resolution of
the matter, employers may want to implement alternate dispute
resolution programs, such as mediation and arbitration, in order to
show that the employees' complaints are taken seriously.
204. See Edward T. Ellis and Tara L. Eyer, Racial Harassment and How Employers Try
To Prevent It, SD06 ALI-ABA 695, 711-712 (July 23, 1998).
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Because the Court failed to provide clear guidance to employ-
ers on how to protect themselves from liability, courts deciding
cases subsequent to Faragher and Ellerth have the task of further
developing the requirements of the affirmative defense. For
example, the District Court in Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Systems addressed the first prong of the affirmative de-
fense-whether the employer exercised "reasonable care to prevent
and promptly correct" the racial harassment.2 5 The court found
that because the employer could not set forth evidence that its anti-
harassment policy was ever distributed to its employees or that
management ever received any kind of training with respect to
issues of racial harassment, it did not prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that it exercised reasonable care to prevent racial
harassment.2 °6 This finding stresses the importance of employee
training and awareness programs. The District Court in Fierro v.
Saks Fifth Avenue evaluated the second prong of the affirmative
defense-whether the employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any corrective opportunities provided by the employ-
er.2 7 The court noted that the employee testified that although
he was aware that the employer had a complaint procedure, he
declined to take advantage of it because he was afraid of the
repercussions.2"8 The court held that, as a matter of law, "gener-
alized fears can never constitute reasonable grounds for an employ-
ee's failure to complain to his or her employer.""2 9 This holding
provides employers with the assurance that employees cannot strip
them of the affirmative defense by merely stating that they did not
take advantage of the employers' procedures because they were
afraid of the consequences of their complaints.
With regard to this affirmative defense, we can expect
significant litigation on what constitutes sufficient behavior by both
employers and victims. Although we do not know what will further
develop in future litigation, taking the precautions set forth above
will allow employers to prevent harassing conduct in the workplace
before it occurs, thereby increasing the potential for avoiding
205. See No. 3:94-0048, 1998 WL 546852 (M.D. Tenn. July 13, 1998) (race discrimination
case).
206. See id. at *10.
207. See No. 97 CIV.6385 (CLB), 1998 WL 388971 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1998) (national
origin discrimination case).




liability. There is, however, one thing for certain: Faragher and
Ellerth send a clear message to employers-ignore signs of
harassment at your own risk.
IV. Conclusion
In Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme Court intended to mend
the divergence in lower court decisions pertaining to employer
liability in hostile work environment claims. It is evident that the
Court has not satisfied its goal. Many questions have been left
unanswered. For example, the Court did not clarify what is
sufficient behavior by employers to meet the requirements of the
affirmative defense. Additionally, the Court failed to explain what
constitutes sufficient proof that an employee failed to adequately
use existing procedures provided by the employer. More impor-
tantly, aside from these two unresolved issues, the Court failed to
explicitly state whether the new standards governing employer
liability are applicable to only sexual harassment cases or if they
also govern other forms of harassment under Title VII. One can
infer from the plain language of these cases that the Court's
objective was to mend the divergence in the law governing
employer liability under Title VII generally and not only in sexual
harassment cases. Applying the principles established in Faragher
and Ellerth to only claims of sexual harassment would be contrary
to the Court's intended objective of unifying the law under Title
VII. It appears from the decisions rendered subsequent to
Faragher and Ellerth that courts agree that the standards estab-
lished by the Supreme Court are not limited to sexual harassment
cases. As seen in Donald v. Benson Motor Co., Inc.,210 however,
not all courts have reached this same conclusion. If other courts
agree with the Donald Court and find that these standards apply to
only sexual harassment cases, there will be a further divergence in
the law governing employer liability under Title VII, which is
precisely what the Supreme Court aimed to rectify.
Limiting these standards to only sexual harassment claims is
both contrary to legal thought in general and morally unconscion-
able. Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, race is considered a suspect class, not sex, and cases
of race discrimination are subject to the highest scrutiny. If the




applicability of the .Faragher and Ellerth standards is restricted to
sexual harassment cases only, the result will be contrary to that of
the Fourteenth Amendment-it will be easier for a white woman
to succeed on a sexual harassment claim than it will be for a black
woman to succeed on a racial harassment claim under Title VII.
Due to the overwhelming presence of racial prejudice throughout
history, it is morally apprehensible for sexual harassment cases to
receive more favorable legal treatment.
Whether courts will agree that the Supreme Court's intention
was to mend the divergence in employer liability under Title VII
generally and not only in sexual harassment cases is to be seen in
future litigation. Although we cannot predict the future, we can
hope that courts will recognize the serious repercussions of limiting
the applicability of these standards to only sexual harassment cases
and will apply them equally to all forms of harassment under Title
VII.
Debra Domenick
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